Question Title * We have heard many descirptions of the "maker/taker" model prevalent at trading venues today. Please tell us how you feel about each of these characterizations. Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree Maker Taker fees are "the oil that makes trading run" by rewarding liquidity provision. Maker Taker fees are "the oil that makes trading run" by rewarding liquidity provision. Strongly Agree Maker Taker fees are "the oil that makes trading run" by rewarding liquidity provision. Agree Maker Taker fees are "the oil that makes trading run" by rewarding liquidity provision. Disagree Maker Taker fees are "the oil that makes trading run" by rewarding liquidity provision. Strongly Disagree Maker Taker fees are "distortive incentives that obscure actual bid/ask spreads by masking fees that ought to be represented in the bid/ask spread." Maker Taker fees are "distortive incentives that obscure actual bid/ask spreads by masking fees that ought to be represented in the bid/ask spread." Strongly Agree Maker Taker fees are "distortive incentives that obscure actual bid/ask spreads by masking fees that ought to be represented in the bid/ask spread." Agree Maker Taker fees are "distortive incentives that obscure actual bid/ask spreads by masking fees that ought to be represented in the bid/ask spread." Disagree Maker Taker fees are "distortive incentives that obscure actual bid/ask spreads by masking fees that ought to be represented in the bid/ask spread." Strongly Disagree Maker Taker fees are "violations of anti-bribery laws used to payoff preferred participants." Maker Taker fees are "violations of anti-bribery laws used to payoff preferred participants." Strongly Agree Maker Taker fees are "violations of anti-bribery laws used to payoff preferred participants." Agree Maker Taker fees are "violations of anti-bribery laws used to payoff preferred participants." Disagree Maker Taker fees are "violations of anti-bribery laws used to payoff preferred participants." Strongly Disagree Question Title * Should co-locators be subject to "affirmative or negative obligations" in the same way that specialists/market makers who also had "location advantage" were? Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree Question Title * The "trade at" rule proposal seems, at first glance, to be a reasonable protection for those market participants courageous enough to publicly display their trading intentions. Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree Question Title * Why would a trade at rule not be appropriate? Question Title * General consensus suggests that equity markets have performed well over the past 18 months. Strongly Agree Agree Disagree Strongly Disagree Question Title * What do you see as key issues requiring regulatory action? Question Title * Is the regulation of Exchanges and ATS's properly balanced? Yes No If not, where should the focus be? Question Title * Some comment letters already submitted suggest that the minimum price improvement should be not less than .01 (except for low priced securities) - is this reasonable? Yes No Question Title * It has been suggested that the growth of non-public liquidity threatens the "public quote" - do you think this is accurate? Yes No Why or why not? Question Title * The Commission rather aggressively commits to "protecting" the long term investor - should there be regulatory discrimination included in this "protection"? Yes No Question Title * While we have a set of issues placed before us today - what might you speculate "tomorrow's" issues to include? Question Title * Additional Comments: Done